Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers\u27 Existential Philosophy by Ries, Clayton B.
University of North Dakota 
UND Scholarly Commons 
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects 
8-1-1973 
Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existential 
Philosophy 
Clayton B. Ries 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Ries, Clayton B., "Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existential Philosophy" (1973). Theses and 
Dissertations. 3599. 
https://commons.und.edu/theses/3599 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at 
UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 




Bachelor of Arts, College of St. Thomas, 1970 
Master of Arts, University of North Dakota, 1971
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy





This dissertation submitted by Clayton B. Ries in partial ful­
fillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
from the University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the.Faculty 
Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done.
(Chairman)
Dean of the Graduate School
ii
Permission
FREEDOM AND SELF-BECOMING IN KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIAL 
Title PHILOSOPHY____________________________________________
Department _______Counseling and Guidance ____________ _
Degree___________ Doctor of Philosophy_________________ _
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of 
North Dakota, I agree that the Library of this University shall 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that 
permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be 
granted by the professor who supervised my dissertation work or, 
in his absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of 
the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or pub­
lication or other use of this dissertation or part thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permis­
sion. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given 
to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use 





Without the assistance of my doctoral advisory committee this 
dissertation could not have been written or even begun. Special 
indebtedness is hereby acknowledged to my major advisor and committee 
chairman, Doctor Robert A. Apostal, who offered his support when the 
paper was still in the planning stages and for his insights and con­
structive criticism throughout its execution. An equal debt of grati­
tude is due Doctor Russell A. Peterson, my minor advisor, for the 
innumerable hours he devoted to this project, helping me to probe 
the depth and breadth of Jaspersian thought and its links with the 
counseling process. Finally, my thanks likewise go out to Doctors 
John T. Wynne, Gordon H. Henry, and Theodore I, Messenger for their 




ACKNOWLEDGMENT S ..............................................  iv
A B S T R A C T ..................................................... vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................  2
Statement of Problem 
Need for the Study 
Delimitations 
References 
Definition of Terms 
Design and Organization
II. EXISTENZ: ITS AWAKENING AND FULL REALIZATION ........ 14
Introduction
Incomplete Expressions for the Being of Existenz 
Self-Reflection as the Medium for Realizing 
Existenz
Paradoxical Expressions of Self-Being
III. FREEDOM AND EXISTENTIAL SELF-BECOMING ................  24
Introduction
The Problem of Free Will 
Conceptualizing Existential Freedom
IV. HISTORICITY: CONFINEMENT AND BREADTH OF EXISTENZ . . .  40
Introduction
Historicity as a Boundary Situation 
Historicity as Confinement and Breadth of 
Existenz
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING ..........................  48
Introduction
Possible Philosophic Frameworks 
Jaspersian Concepts and Counseling
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................  58
v
ABSTRACT
One of the primary concerns of contemporary counseling litera­
ture appears to be the self, to what extent it owes its being to free­
dom on the one hand, and to environmental influences on the other.
This paper does not pretend to resolve so complex an issue. It seeks 
rather to view the problem x<rithin a philosophical framework which 
seems to recognize the rightful prerogatives of both contenders in 
the debate, thereby clearing the way for a better understanding of 
the vital issues involved. The philosophical framework proposed is 
that of Karl Jaspers. Within this framework it is proposed that 
Jaspers' concept of existential freedom provides the adequate pre­
condition for self-becoming or Existenz. This existential self­
becoming has decisive implications for the counseling relationship. 
Once the counselor has validated for himself the free effecting of 
his own selfhood, he is prepared to recognize this right and respon­
sibility for his counselee. The counselee in turn accepts this right 
and responsibility for his own Existenz and rejects dependence on the 




IN KARL JASPERS' EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Clayton B. Ries 
University of North Dakota
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Among the widely acknox^ledged concepts basic to the counseling 
literature is that of the self. One of the unsolved problems in self 
theory has been the relationship between the self-concept and the indi­
vidual self.  ̂ However, by making use of an existential approach such 
as that of Karl Jaspers, this dichotomy can be resolved. The existen­
tial self is both what the individual does, and what he is or is becom­
ing. "I am what I come to be— not what I passively grow into, like 
mere living matter, but what I want to be as I come to myself in the 
medium of self-reflection." In this passage from his monumental 
Philosophy, Jaspers epitomizes the principal thrust of this study.
The human being freely creates his oxm selfhood as he comes to an 
awareness of his ovm potential and responsibility as a person.
Statement of Problem
Self-becoming or Existenz, the term used by Jaspers, involves 
for him a confrontation with three fundamental concepts: freedom, 
historicity and communication. Freedom constitutes the necessary
•'-Ledford J. Bischof, Interpreting Personality Theories (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 595.
^C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 516.
^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, trans. by E. B. Ashton, three 
volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971), p. 38.
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precondition to the creating of one's self-becoming. In his own words, 
"What the word choice expresses is that in my free decision I am not 
only conscious of acting in the world but of creating my own being in 
historic continuity."^ Historicity, the second principal concept under 
consideration, is also suggested in the just quoted citation. Its 
implications for Existenz are that "A sense of historicity can simul­
taneously lend absolute weight to existence, as grasped by self-being, 
and keep it in suspension and relative, as mere existence."-' Finally, 
in Jaspersian thought there is no realization of self-being without 
communication. " . . .  the origin of self-being which comes by itself 
and yet, in essence, is not of and by itself alone.
It is proposed that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom 
provides an adequate precondition for the becoming of Existenz and 
results in decisive implications for the counselor and counselee 
and their relationship. One of these is that the counselor recog­
nizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to effect freely 
his own selfhood, something he has first validated for himself.
Another implication is that the counselee freely accepts this right 
and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting dependence on 
the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come to himself 
in authentic self-being.
Need for the Study
This study is written not without an awareness of the efforts 





self and the implications of both for the counseling relationship and 
those individuals involved in it. Neither is it an attack on a spe­
cific theory of counseling. However, in some instances it will be 
pointed out how an existential approach might offer a more consistent, 
adequate or integral view of man and his situation than usually pro­
posed. More specifically, far from its being inane speculation with 
head in the clouds, "Existentialism is an endeavor to understand man 
as he really is. It takes issue with the assumption of science that 
to know the essence of man means that we have grasped the reality of
man."7
Delimitations
Whereas self-being ceases in the isolated ego, implying the 
need for communication, this study limits itself to a consideration 
of what existential freedom brings to the realization of Existenz.
It asks what is required as the absolute precondition for communica­
tion between two selves in historic consciousness, as well as the 
implications derived therefrom for the counselor and counselee and 
their relationship.
References
Primary sources cited in the course of this study are con­
tained in the following list of references. Also included is a work 
edited by Schilpp which contains Jaspers' Philosophical Autobiog­
raphy and Reply to My Critics, besides various critical essays about 
Jaspers.
7C. Gratton Kemp, Existential Counseling, p. 2, in Existen­
tialism, ed. by J. M. Whiteley (Counseling Psychologist, 1971, 2_, 3).
Jaspers, K. Existenzphilosophie. Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter 
and Co., 1938.
Jaspers, K. Von der Warheit. Munich: R. Piper, 1947.
Jaspers, K. Rechenschaft und Ausblick. Reden und Aufsatze. Munich: 
R. Piper, 1951.
Jaspers, K. Reason and Existenz. Translated by William Earle. New 
York: Noonday, 1955.
Jaspers, K. General Psychopathology. Translated by J. Hoenig and 
M. W. Hamilton. Manchester, England: University Press,
1963.
5
Jaspers, K. Philosophy. Translated by E. B. Ashton, three volumes. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 1970, 1971.
Schilpp, P. A. (ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. New York:
Tudor, 1957.
Definition of Terms
Since Jaspers' philosophy is characterized by a dynamic flox-7 of 
thought, it was judged advisable to consider his basic concepts as an 
organic whole by way of an overview rather than list them in isolated 
fashion. On the other hand, Jaspers regarded his philosophical work 
not as a system, but as systematically connected and open structure. 
Therefore it follows that the concept for him is somewhat indefinite, 
pregnant and growing.
Since every philosophical thought is true only in a movement, 
and since this movement must be assimilated authentically and 
its repetition must be alive in order to remain true, a pri­
macy of terminology . . .  is catastrophic. . . . The domina­
tion by terminology turns philosophizing into that academic 
pedantry in which philosophy itself has vanished.®
To gain the proper perspective for a view of Jaspers' philosophy
it must be kept in mind that his philosophizing is primarily and
OKarl Jaspers, Von der Warheit, p. 428, in Philosophy of Karl 
Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.
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essentially a search for Being. And man's concrete historical situation 
is the factor that largely determines the kind of questions asked and 
the answers received regarding the nature of that Being. Philosophy 
must make a fresh beginning in each individual, as he confronts his own 
insecurity, his own challenges. As a result it is always in process 
and in flux. It can never be presented in the form of a universally 
binding doctrine. For Jaspers philosophy seems to contain two layers 
of meaning. There is the one of objective truth and consistency XvdLth 
empirical fact, and the other which is that of the depth and intensity 
of the personal assimilation of this truth.
World is the first concept to be considered. In-its broadest 
sense it signifies the totality of being. Jaspers distinguishes three 
general concepts of being: being-an-object, being-a-self and Being- 
in-itself. Only the first of these three can become an object of 
thought, those objects in space and time including things, persons, 
thoughts and ideas. This level of being constitutes the world in 
its narrower sense and is called existence.
Existenz is being-a-self in so far as the human individual 
freely determines his own being. Human existence for Jaspers can 
never become an object of knowledge in the same sense in which the 
world does. True, the individual self has a psycho-physical aspect 
which is empirical in nature and as such identical in structure with 
other selves. But the self is also more. As the locus for possible 
freedom of thought and action, this self is potential Existenz. 
Existential reality cannot be grasped conceptually since it expresses 
itself only in its own freedom, a mode not contained within the 
empirical categories. Jaspers, with regard to making oneself an
7
object of thought, even has this to say. " . . .  I can become in no 
manner the object of my ox-m speculation, I cannot know myself, but have 
only the alternative of either reaching self-realization, or else of 
losing myself." Existenz is "the axis around which all I am, and all
Qthat can become truly meaningful for me in the world turns."
Kierkegaard is Jaspers' primary source for the specific content
of the term Existenz, in itself simply a word meaning existence.
No definable concept— xtfhich would presuppose some kind of 
objective being— can express the being of Existenz. The 
very word is just one of the German synonyms for "being."
The philosophical idea began obscurely, as a mere inkling 
of what Kierkegaard's use of the word has since made his­
torically binding upon us.-^
Kierkegaard in turn borrowed from Schelling the distinction between Idea 
and Existenz. It xxras the former who once and for all obliterated the 
dependence of the concept of Existenz on Hegel's universal Idea, thus 
vindicating for this concept those subjective and utterly personal 
qualities which Jaspers was later to borrow from him.
Since Existenz, according to Jaspers, cannot really be defined 
he makes use of a set of existential categories instead to circumscribe 
that term. Among the principal categories are freedom, historicity and 
communication. These in a sense determine the existential reality in a 
manner analogous to that in which the laxre of causality determine empir­
ical existence.
Existential freedom and Existenz are in actuality txro sides of 
the same reality and are almost interchangeable concepts for Jaspers. 
This idea seems to emerge clearly in the following citation.
9Ibid., p. 76. In Schilpp, op. cit., p. 99.
■^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy I, p. 56, note.
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My resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer 
merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom in 
which I can no longer separate the choice and me because 1_ 
am this free choice . . . freedom is the choice of my own 
self. This is why I cannot step out once again to choose 
between being myself and not being myself, as if freedom 
were nothing but a tool of mine. I am be choosing, rather; 
if I am not, I choose not. What I am myself is left open, 
of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent 
I am not yet.H
What Jaspers seems to be saying is that the exercise of one's freedom 
need not result merely in a series of decisions concerning disconnected 
or insignificant happenings. No, the exercise of freedom is the sole 
and adequate source of self-becoming or Existenz. In fact, free choice 
is one's Existenz.
Historicity expresses more than any other concept Jaspers' devi­
ation from traditional philosophy.^ For Jaspers it signifies both the 
limitation and the dimension of depth which attaches to man's being-in­
time. Historicity is that quality of Existenz that denotes the unity 
of the individual, as well as for personal human existence within the 
empirical world. Analytical thought tends to separate Existenz from 
its concrete historical situation, while this situation is in fact the 
only mode for its appearance. Freedom too becomes real only through 
its bond with the body and with the world. Historicity is moreover 
the medium in which communication transpires. Jaspers gives expres­
sion to all this:
Something quite different is the existential historic con­
sciousness proper, in which the self becomes aware of its
-^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.
■*-̂ Kurt Hoffman, Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy, in 
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 
1957), p. 101.
9
historicity as the only reality it has. . . .  It makes me axrare 
of myself in communication with other historic self-being; I as 
myself am phenomenally bound in time to a sequence of singular 
situations, my given situations.13
Existential communication is for Jaspers the sole means for the 
realization of self-being.
Existential communication is not to be modeled and is not to 
be copied; each time it is flatly singular. It occurs between 
two selves which are nothing else, are not representative, and 
are therefore not interchangeable. In this communication, 
which is absolutely historic and unrecognizable from outside, 
lies the assurance of selfhood. It is the one x̂ ay by which a 
self is for a self, in mutual creation. The tie to it is a 
historical decision on the part of a self: to void its self­
being as an isolated I and to enter into communicative self­
being. 1^
Difficult as it is to recognize existential communication as such, the 
forms it may take Jaspers acknoxtfledges are as diverse as the ordinary 
modes of communication among humans.
The Encompassing is that concept whereby Jaspers attempted to
provide a vantage point from which to philosophize out of the totality
of being. Its point of departure is the thought that whatever becomes
an object of one's thinking is only one conceivable kind of being among
others, only one mode of being. One cannot reach a position from which
to view the closed whole of being, a position that no longer points to
something beyond. Being remains forever unclosed for the thinking mind
and keeps drawing it ever onward into the horizon on all sides.
We always live and think within a horizon. But the very 
fact that it is a horizon indicates something further 
which again surrounds the given horizon. From this sit­
uation arises the question about the Encompassing. The 
Encompassing is not a horizon x^ithin which every
UKarl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 104-105. 
l^lbid., p. 54.
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determinate mode of Being and truth emerges for us, but rather 
that within which every particular horizon is enclosed as in 
something absolutely comprehensive which is no longer visible 
as a horizon at all.-^
As soon as it is thought, the one Encompassing splits into its 
seven modes. First there is the Encompassing in which the x̂ orld or 
external being appears, and the Encompassing which the thinking individ­
ual is, which is consciousness-at-large or consciousness of empirical 
knowledge. Next the individual is also concrete and temporal existence 
and the carrier of that consciousness-at-large. Then he is spirit in 
so far as ideas guide and unify his life. Finally the Encompassing 
undergoes a third split involving a double leap. One is from the 
world to Transcendence, the other from existence to Existenz.
The Encompassing is that vehicle of thought that enables things 
to become more than they are on their surface, an added quality that 
empowers them to take on their unique transparency and depth. But 
despite this cumulative impulse and thrust, knowledge is for Jaspers 
still radically unable to reach Being-in-itself. The moment one 
believes he has grasped Being conceptually, ha has already falsified 
it by making it into an objective content, which by definition it is 
not.
However there is a mode of knowledge proper to Encompassing 
Being. One becomes ax̂ are of it, rather than cognizes it directly. 
Something of itself non-objective is first thought in the form of an 
objective entity, but which acts merely as a catalyst and bridges the 
gap leading from the objective knowledge to the awareness of Being- 
in-itself in a reflexive thought. Jaspers here seems to draw attention
•'"'’Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, p. 52, trans. by by 
William Earle (New York: Noonday, 1955), p. 52.
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to the fact that there must be a direct givenness of Being, prior to 
all thought about Being, at the source of all thought and at the 
foundation of all knowledge. Without that primal awareness knowledge 
remains for him a superficial collection of data. With it everything 
that is known objectively can be blended into an awareness of Being.
Transcendence is "The source and the goal, both of which lie 
in God and out of whose depths alone we really become authentically 
h u m a n . A c c o r d i n g  to Jaspers Transcendence is the philosopher's 
name for God. Together with Existenz it embodies one of the two 
polar concepts of Jaspersian philosophy. Existenz is directed to 
Transcendence which surpasses the individuality of Existenz, appear­
ing only where the empirical and intelligible give way. Being-in-, 
itself encompasses Existenz, xrtiich is aware of it and participates 
in it. In this way individual historical truth is included in and 
enveloped by the truth of Being and its subjectivity resolves itself 
in the affirmation of a transcendent reality. The absoluteness of 
Existenz gives way before an ultimate non-subjective Being, which is 
Transcendence or Being-in-itself.
Nevertheless, since knowledge is unable to attain a direct 
grasp of Being, for Jaspers the realm of Transcendence can only be 
dealt xriLth in the language of symbols, xtfhich he calls ciphers.
World, Existenz and Transcendence are the three ideal realms of 
being. Conceptually distinct, they are ultimately bridged by the 
concept of historicity. The xrorld and the self are thus connected, 
the world as the ground for the freedom of the self and the self as
l^Karl Jaspers, Rechenschaft und Ausblick, p. 264, in 
Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 
1957), p. 96.
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accepting and assimilating the world. The concept of the cipher leads 
similarly from the world through its appearances to Transcendence.
Philosophical faith, declares Jaspers, is man's only genuine
response to and bond with Transcendence. Its sole alternative is
abdication of one's selfhood and surrender to nihilism. Within his
own personal and historical situation, the individual as Existenz is
confronted with a most basic and extreme decision, whether in the
anguish of boundary situations he will keep faith with Transcendence
and in his own selfhood and independence.
If thinking philosophically means: learning how to die, it 
does so not by abandoning the present in fear and with 
thoughts of death, but by intensifying the present through 
never ending activity in the light of Transcendence. Hence, 
Transcendence means nothing to us if everything that is, is 
merely "a form of life" for us; and likewise, Transcendence 
is everything to us if that which is essential to us is so 
only in relation to Transcendence, or as a symbol of Tran­
scendence. ̂
Boundary situations are ;
Situations like the following: that I am always in situa­
tions; that I cannot live without struggling and suffering; 
that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die— these are what 
I call boundary situations. They never change, except in 
appearance. There is no way to survey them in existence, 
no way to see anything behind them. They are like a wall 
we run into, a wall on which we founder. We cannot modify 
them; all that we can do is to make them lucid, but with­
out explaining or deducing them from something else. They 
go with existence itself.™
There can be little more to add by way of saying what the boundary situ­
ations are. What is decisive is Ik w  the individual rises to meet these 
boundaries of empirical life. The response may be indifference, escape
•^Karl Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie, p. 71, in Philosophy of 
Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 96.
-^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 178.
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or helpless dejection,
. . . but in the end we can do nothing hut surrender. The 
meaningful way for us to react to boundary situations is 
therefore not by planning and calculating to overcome them 
but by the very different activity of becoming the Existenz 
we potentially are; we become ourselves by entering with 
open eyes into the boundary situations. . . .  To experience 
boundary situations is the same as Existenz.-^
Design and Organization
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II takes up the con­
cept of the self or self-becoming through its stages from initial awak­
ening to full realization in Existenz. Then in Chapter III, the concept 
of existential freedom is considered from the standpoint of the function 
of the will, followed by a review of freedom in itself and in its rela­
tion to existence, necessity and Transcendence. Chapter IV, after devel­
oping the situational concept of historicity, in this context brings 
together the key concepts of Existenz and existential freedom and views 
them in their mutual complementation. Finally, Chapter V considers the 
implications of the previous chapters for counseling theory.
•^Ibid. , p. 179.
CHAPTER II
EXISTENZ: ITS AWAKENING AND FULL REALIZATION
Introduction
Implicit in the essential forward thrust of this chapter is•the 
answer to a vital question. That question is whether the being of the 
world, existence, the object of consciousness-at-large, is all there 
is. Jaspers asks it this way:
What is there, as against all mundane being? . . . We answer: 
there is the being xtfhich in the phenomenality of existence is ■ 
not, but can be, ought to be. . . . This being is myself as 
Existenz. . . .  In Existenz I know, without being able to see 
it, that what I call my "self" is independent. The possibil­
ity of Existenz is what I live by; it is only in its realiza­
tion that I am myself.1
This specific concept of the self is not Jaspers' exclusive pro­
perty, however. As Wallraff attests, "The . . . idea of an innermost
and uninvestigable self— a hidden source beyond experience which all
2experience presupposes— is widely shared." Therefore this chapter 
will attempt to clarify or elucidate, to use Jaspers' term, self­
becoming or Existenz. Its method is first of all to consider, within 
the framework of the concept of the Encompassing, the possible but 
still incomplete answers to the question of self-being. Then it
1Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, P- 3.
^Charles F. Wallraff, 
Philosophy (Princeton, N. J.:
p. 97.
Karl Jaspers, An Introduction to His 
Princeton University Press, 1970),
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takes up self-reflection, the medium in which self-being can be either 
realized or lost. Finally it reflects on the paradoxical expressions to 
which Existenz gives rise. In them self-becoming is clothed in human 
language which at once partially clarifies and partially obscures its 
meaning.
Incomplete Expressions for the Being of Existenz
I at Large
The first of these incomplete expressions of self-being is 1̂ at 
large, a composite term that must be viex<red in the light of conscious­
ness at lajrge within the total framework of the concept of the Encom- 
In this term _! is the being that grasps itself, that makes 
object of knowledge. Thus the I is in a subject-object 
but not in a radical one like its division from things in 
The _I is aware of itself in a kind of circle with itself. 
How can the _I grasp itself? It can do so only as a thinking subject, 
as that which constitutes the core of all self-consciousness. In this 
_I think the grasps itself as identical with itself. "At the moment 
of thinking, the _I as _I think is sure of its existence in the world.
It does not knoxv what it is, but at its present time it does know that 






with every other. But the individual is not on3.y I at large, he is
The I think does not constitute his self, since it is only
an A at large. He is simply posited in it as a point-like subject
drained of himself. Lacking any substance, it expresses only one's 
self-consciousness as one being among others.
'̂ arl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 27.
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Aspects of the I, or Four Reflections 
of the Individual's Existence
Inability to find oneself in the I_ ajt large may lead one to turn 
to his concrete existence. Here he is not only aware of himself, he is 
aware of himself under different aspects, as in so many mirrors. In none 
of them, however, does he see himself entirely. He perceives sides of 
his being and to some extent identifies with them, but does not achieve 
a full identity with himself in any.
When one says _I what does he mean? First of all he is referring 
to his body. Without it he cannot act, and likewise he has to suffer 
whatever befalls it. He forms a unity with it. Its vitality or lack of 
it makes him feel strong or weak, ill at ease or glad to be alive. 
Although he remains one with his body, he seems to stand apart from it 
at the very instant he experiences it. This unity still does not estab­
lish identity. He is not his body. If he were his physical 3̂, it would 
be incongruous that some body parts were not essential to him. He can 
lose limbs, various organs, even parts of his brain, yet remains himself. 
He may be present in the body’s vital functions, but those functions are 
not his self. In last analysis his physical 1̂ is in his hands. Yet even 
if he takes the extreme measure of taking his own life to demonstrate his 
refusal to recognize his body as one with himself, he can only kill it, 
his body. Even then he must ask if henceforth he will be simply nothing.
When one rates in the context of social life is another aspect 
or mirror of the I_. One’s professional functions or job, the effect he 
has on others evokes a picture of what he is. He comes to feel that he 
is what he is for others. To be at all, everyone needs not only a body 
but a society, even if he stands outside or against society. The social
17
I so dominates people that a man's nature will seem to change along with 
changes in his social position and in the people he associates with. As 
a social 1̂  however, he is not himself either. Although it is imposed 
on him, he can still put up an inner resistance to it. Throughout all 
changes he can remain himself, regardless of any social loss or gain.
In his social existence he can be conscious of a role which he plays.
But to him his role and his 1̂ are two different things. He knows him­
self only in his role, and yet he is not identical with it.
Society moreover rates one according to what he does. To him 
this constitutes a new mirror of what he is. What he has accomplished, 
what he can see as his success, his work, or what strikes him as his 
failure or wrongdoing, all this objectifies him to himself in its own 
fashion. In the active I his sense of being seems to merge with his 
sense of achievement. But here again he is not merely what he achieves. 
He can even come into conflict with it, or reject it as something no 
longer congruous with his ever changing demands on himself. What was 
once his achievement may turn itself into a thing from which he detaches 
himself.
I myself— while relatively acknowledging my works as mine 
and keeping faith with myself in upholding them— avoid 
identifying with them, especially as they seem to rob me 
of myself when I sense future possibilities, and when my 
present goal is what can make me sure of myself.
Finally, it is by his past that one knows what he is. What he 
has been and experienced, thought and done, how he has been helped or 
what he has been made to bear, all this determines what he is conscious 
of being now, whether it is presently unknown or consciously remembered.
4Ibid., p. 31.
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This is also where he derives his self-respect of his self-contempt, as 
well as the sympathies and antipathies that move him. This reminiscent 
I will objectify him to himself by mirroring his past to him. However, 
if he identified with this reminiscent I he would lose himself. He 
would be setting up the past as a criterion of what he wants to be, 
thereby depreciating both the present and future and their possibil­
ities. Then he would not be what he becomes, but rather what he 
believes he has been. Thus his very concept of the present and the 
future will be as if they already were in the past. A decision in 
the present can once again unfold or wither the sense and signifi­
cance of memory.
Four aspects of the 1̂ as holding out possible answers to the 
question of the nature of Existenz have been considered. But what was 
discovered was a schematization of objective existence, not an adequate 
statement of self-being. In each, one could find himself in the schema, 
but each time he had the experience that it did not fit entirely.
"None of these objectivations will achieve an absolute identity with 
myself. I go beyond such schemata; in them I would be bound to lose 
myself.
Character, the Encompassing's Third 
Mode Response to the Question of 
Self-Being
When one asks once more what he is, he wants to know what is for 
him the being underneath his phenomenal or outward self. He has no 
direct way of knowing the kind and quality of his own being-in-itself,
5Ibid., p. 32.
19
but he infers it is that which underlies all his phenomena. One day he 
will have the experience that he not only exists and cannot be whatever 
he would like to be, he also finds himself the way he is. He may be 
amazed or ashamed, terrified or captivated to learn from his actions how 
he is. Throughout his life he experiences a dependency upon a being of 
himself he cannot fully control, a being he directs, promotes and 
restrains. It is a being too which may become for him a meaningful 
object of psychological research. This being is his character. Yet 
there is still something in him that resists recognition of himself as 
being simply given the way he is. He may even be disturbed in being 
that way. Although he may not know how to change it directly, he does 
know he is free. "I retrieve myself from the very being-in-itself that 
would make me resemble a given thing, and out of this given state, or 
against it, I take up myself."^
Three responses to the question as to the nature of Existenz 
have now been heard. The individual said 31 in three different senses 
but each sense was only a mode of his _I, not his intrinsic self. Thus 
for him there is not yet a totality of what he is. He comes up against 
limits in the I _at large, in the aspects of the J[, and in the way he is 
due to his character. Indirectly, nevertheless, the thoughts he cannot 
avoid in his efforts to objectify himself x̂ ill provide a degree of lucid­
ity. First, he takes note of the shortcoming each time. There is more 
to him still. Then, in his self-retrieval from all objectivity, although 
illuminated by it, what has been thought each time will be excluded from 
himself. The result is an indirect knowledge about himself, rather than 
a knowledge of himself. "The self is more than all I can know."^
^Ibid., p. 33. l̂oc. cit.
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Self-Reflection as the Medium for Realizing Existenz
It has just been pointed out how the individual retrieves him­
self from the 1 of consciousness at large, from the profusion of aspects 
in which he appears empirically to himself, and from his character as 
the given way he is. In this retrieval is implied an acting on oneself 
suggesting the origin of a new self-comprehension. He has examined what 
he is, impersonally and objectively, and finds nothing more than an. 
abundance of ever-particular facts. But he goes on to examine what he 
is intrinsically and he sees that his self-being is still up to him.
When he says JL myself, he no longer relates to himself merely contem­
platively, but effectively. In actively dealing with himself he now 
finds the potentiality for authentic being, for Existenz. And since it 
is only potentiality accounts for there never being an end or a comple­
tion in time, why he does not know himself and is sure of himself only 
by becoming himself.
Self-reflection then is a new way to pose the question of self­
being. Its aim is no longer mere self-knowledge. No, the question is 
a spur to come to oneself. In existential self-reflection the individ­
ual looks for himself as emerging from his judgment on himself. This 
judgment involves a seriousness incompatible with that curiosity about 
oneself that underlies judgments made in consciousness at large. Know­
ing oneself does not mean looking at oneself as in a mirror, but working 
on oneself so that he will become who he is. "In self-reflection I turn 
back from things in the world, back to myself, to my actions, to my moti­
vations and emotions, to examine whether they are what I am myself and 
what I want to be."^
^Ibid., p. 36.
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Essentially self-reflection is not an end but a means. What mat­
ters each time is that and how one emerges from it. Self-reflection is 
not self-study but self-communication. One does not realize it as cog­
nition but as self-creation. Whenever one reflects upon himself he is 
for a moment both no longer and not yet himself. At that instant he is 
his potential in the point that separates his state of unconcern and 
his entering the door to his own intrinsic originality. Finally, the 
impulse behind the self-reflection in which one passes from one judg­
ment to the next, making distinctions and analyzing, is his will to 
have one decision originate. His resolve to put an end to self­
reflection is thus an expression of self-being, a means of encounter 
with the self.
Paradoxical Expressions of Self-Being
The first of these antinomical statements is that one becomes
himself only as he overcomes himself. Empirically he could conceive
his being as his character, as the way he happens to be. But his
character does not constitute his intrinsic self. It is something
rather that he has and relates to. The being of his character has the
blindness of a given fact. Through struggle alone does he transform
it into a freely willed being in which his self unfolds, the self for
which he takes responsibility.
. . .  in phenomenality there is no truthful I without 
self-conquest. I discard shells of my self, the ones 
I judge to be untrue, in order to gain my more profound, 
my intrinsic, my infinite, my true self. To come to my­
self as I perish is the phenomenon of self-being.^
^Ibid., p. 44.
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Self-being and self-conquest in self-reflection may turn into an
endless circle. Although one’s existence in the world provides footholds
for breaking out of this circle, he is enabled to break through it only
by Transcendence. This is the second paradox. Self-being is the union
of two opposites, of standing on one's own feet and of yielding both to
the world and to Transcendence. One comes to Existenz by participating
in his active world, only by being involved in his spatial and temporal
existence. And just as he does not come to Existenz apart from the
world, he cannot come to himself without Transcendence.
. . .  I am conscious of my Existenz only in relation to the 
Transcendence without which I slide into the void. When I 
see myself in the phenomena of existence, I never see my 
true self; Transcendence alone lends to all finite phenom­
ena a weight they could not have as mere existence. u
By way of summary, this chapter has considered three basic 
approaches to the problem of self-being or Existenz. First, in 1 at 
large, aware of itself as a thinking subject, the _I is conscious that 
it has being in the world. Its shortcoming is that this thinking I . 
is not oneself, it simply constitutes his self-consciousness as one 
being among others. A further step along this first approach was to 
search for self-being in the four aspects of one's concrete existence, 
in the physical jC, the social 1_, the active I_, and the reminiscent 1.
But what one discovered here xjere four objectivations of one's exist­
ence, rather than adequate statements of self-being. Nor did character, 
as that which underlies one's outward self, provide the answer. There 
was still something that resisted taking himself as merely given the 
way he is. These first three responses did provide, nevertheless, an
10Ibid., p. 46.
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indirect knowledge of Existenz. The second basic approach was a consid­
eration of self-reflection as the medium, for the realization of self­
being. It results in self-communication which serves as the impetus for 
self-becoming. Finally, the third basic approach consisted in looking 
at two paradoxical expressions for the being of Existenz. Much as in 
the first approach, their function is seen primarily in terms of pro­
viding a kind of indirect knowledge of self-being by way of the clash 
between two apparently mutually contradictory statements.
CHAPTER III
FREEDOM AND EXISTENTIAL SELF-BECOMING 
Introduction
Why raise the question of freedom in relation to the being of 
Existenz? Because for Jaspers there is no Existenz, no self-being for 
the individual as he is in mere empirical existence. It is through 
freedom alone that he achieves selfhood. "In my free decision I am 
. . . conscious of . . . creating my own being . .
Freedom exists as volition. It comes to realization through 
the exercise of the will. Therefore this chapter will take up first 
the problem of free will in order to determine its relevance to the 
question of freedom. Then the concept of freedom itself will be con­
sidered, in its existential elucidation and in its relation to exist­
ence, necessity and Transcendence.
The Problem of Free Will
Propositions proclaiming the freedom or unfreedom of the will 
have long engaged in battle under the names of determinism and indeter­
minism. It was almost as if man's being were hanging on a theoretical 
decision. What is often overlooked is that the object of this struggle 
is not what freedom was originally all about. Possibly some examples 
will help clarify the issue.
•̂ Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 160.
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One of the assertions about freedom understands free to mean 
without cause. Regarding the question of free will this would take the 
form of saying that in case of two equally strong possibilities, if any­
thing at all is to happen, one possibility must be strengthened so as 
to be' realized by choice rather than by necessity. This argument seems 
to show freedom more as coincidence and arbitrariness rather than as 
freedom proper, however.
Another assertion is one in which free xvill is defined psycho­
logically as freedom of action without disturbance from outside. This 
can be thought of as a psychological freedom to act insofar as onefe 
intentions can be undisturbedly translated into reality, and to choose 
by making a calm and orderly selection from the possibilities one is 
aware of. Conceiving free will in this manner seems plausible enough 
in its objectivity but disappointing in its lack of substance. But it 
does not seem to answer the question of free will as it does not deter­
mine precisely that will whereby one assumes responsibility for his own 
self-being.
Nevertheless, this psychological view does touch the borderline 
of freedom proper when one asks whether he has an inner freedom of voli­
tion itself, beyond the externally qualified freedoms of action and 
choice. In choice and in action the motives and goals one chooses from 
must already exist. The questions that arise then are, can one freely 
choose the kind and content of his motives? And can he freely choose 
the standards that govern his selection? Is he moreover responsible 
for the kind of person he is, for his character? Could he possibly 
have another will as well? Such questions appear beyond the scope of
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the empirical psychologist and must look instead for indirect existen­
tial clarification.
A third objective freedom attributed to the will concerns human 
relationships in society and in the state. From a sociological stand­
point personal, civil, and political freedom can be distinguished. The 
personal one requires only the possession of economic means to be free 
even in the absence of political and civil liberty, as in one of the 
modern dictatorships. Civil freedom obtains even in a state of politi­
cal unfreedom if the law assures equal protection. The political one 
allows every citizen to participate in the selection of his leaders. 
Their existence in general cannot be doubted, but it does not answer 
the question about freedom and Existenz. The presence of these free­
doms does not assure the realization of Existenz, nor would their 
absence make its realization impossible, although its exercise would 
be restricted.
Thus psychological and sociological freedoms are never freedom 
itself, but they are not irrelevant to it. The individual who knows 
he is free is aware that they are conditions of the appearance of free­
dom in existence if he wants realization in the world, and not merely 
possibility and internality.
The fight between determinism and indeterminism will continue 
as long as objective arguments are used to settle the nature of free­
dom. In this fight both sides lose sight of true freedom. On the one 
hand whatever objective evidence is presented for or against it is open 
to refutation. On the other, it rests on the assumption that the being 
of objects in the world exhausts the totality of being. "Freedom is 
neither demonstrable nor refutable. This is what Kant meant by calling
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it ’inconceivable" and viewing the conception of this inconceivability 
as the limit of our insight." In any case, determinism and indeter­
minism place the entire matter on the wrong plane. One side asserts 
freedom's existence while falsely objectifying and thus voiding it in 
fact. It is a defender of freedoms that do not really amount to free­
dom, thus turning its very success into an unconscious denial. The 
other side denies freedom but applies the word to an objective phan­
tom. Jaspers believes both sides are in error. They regard objective 
being as the totality of being, with the result that freedom eludes
-5them.J
Conceptualizing Existential Freedom 
In every kind of questioning there is a sense in which the kind 
of question asked and the mode of the answer somehow relate to the ques­
tioner. But when one asks about freedom his potential self-being is both 
what asks and what answers. He is asking whether and how he takes hold 
of himself or lets himself go. He is not looking about him to see 
whether freedom is out there somewhere in the world. He is asking inso­
far as he is involved in his own question. Without the possibility of 
being free himself he cannot ask about freedom. Hence there is either 
no freedom at all or it is already in asking about it. What makes him 
ask is an original will to be free, so that his freedom is anticipated 
in the fact of asking. He wills it because he was conscious beforehand 
of its possibility. And freedom finally is proved by his actions, 
rather than by his insight,
^Ibid., p . 150.
Loc. cit.
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Yet to say that one might be free is to say that he might also 
be unfree. The agonizing fact that this might be the case is what could 
be called the negative impulse of freedom. As self-being he cannot bear 
the possibility of being unfree. Because things that depend on him can 
be of absolute importance to him, he must be able to be free. This is 
not a conclusion he draws from any facts or conditions. It is the 
expression of his very self-being, of his awareness of his own poten­
tial, of being still in a position to decide about himself.
Freedom, according to Jaspers, is the beginning and end of the 
elucidation of the being of Existenz. It constitutes its most distinc­
tive characteristic. As a preliminary step to conceptualizing this 
existential freedom, freedom as knowledge, as arbitrary act and as law 
will be shown to be indispensable conditions, but not its essence.
Then follows a consideration of freedom as idea, choice and respon­
sibility. Finally, after attempting to clothe existential freedom in 
conceptual language, it will be viewed in relation to existence, 
necessity and Transcendence.
Freedom as Knowledge, as 
Arbitrary Act, as Law
Whatever merely exists or happens in the world is unfree, is 
determined. The individual too finds himself in this existence. But 
he is not just a sequence of events. He knows that he has existence.
He does something and he knows what he is doing. He has to die like 
everything that lives, but he knows he has to die. His knowledge of 
what is taking place necessarily does not free him from any necessity, 
but it lifts his consciousness beyond mere necessity. To be involved 
himself, to understand the things he must do, is a moment of freedom.
29
Knowledge does not make him free, but without knowledge there can be no 
freedom.
Through knowledge the individual can see a range of possibil­
ities. From these he can choose from among the several he knows. Where 
several things are possible for him, the cause of what will occur is his 
arbitrary act. To be sure, he can try to understand this act as a neces­
sary occurrence. His choice depends upon his mode of knowing, and he can 
trace the way this came about. His choice likewise depends on observable 
psychological drives among which the strongest motive prevails. And yet 
he can neither deduce the nature of the arbitrary act nor, with the rigor 
of causal insight, prove or predict any factual decision as necessary in 
a given case. Even if he turns his decision into what appears to him 
mere accident, by flipping a coin for example, the arbitrary element 
remains because he voluntarily places himself in a state of passiye sub­
mission to chance.- What seems random or haphazard is really a sponta­
neity coincident with his freedom and working through arbitrary deci­
sions. As x-?as the case with knowledge, arbitrariness does not amount 
to freedom, but without an arbitrary act there is no freedom.
But suppose one does not knowingly make an arbitrary decision.
He may decide not at random but in accord with a law he recognizes as 
binding. He is free then since he is bowing to a norm he found within 
himself, a norm he could as well not bow to. A law is not an inescap­
able necessity to which he is subject. It is a necessity only in the 
sense of constituting norms of action and motivation with which he can 
either comply or not comply. When he finds these norms to be mani­
festly binding upon him, in recognizing and obeying them he is aware 
of his free self. While acknowledging things that are necessary and
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valid for him, he realizes they may not be necessary in themselves. 
Because the norms are identical with the exigencies of his own self, 
he feels they are self-evidently valid. This freedom, in which one 
freely finds himself by obeying valid norms, is active as opposed to 
mere passive knowledge. It is also sustained by a necessity as 
a gainst the randomness of arbitrary acts. This freedom includes 
that of knowledge and of the arbitrary act. As there can be no 
freedom without those two, there is no freedom without law.
Freedom as Idea, as Choice, 
as Responsibility
Man thus moves toward freedom by an ever broadening orienta­
tion within his world, by a limitless visualizing of premises and 
possibilities of action and by allowing all motives to speak to him 
and work within him. But this aggregate of many parts will bring 
forth freedom only insofar as everything will not just factually tie 
in with everything else but will do so for his consciousness as the 
center of possible Existenz. This is what is meant by freedom as 
idea. The more the self creates order out of this endless diyersity 
of accumulated motives and elements of orientation, the freer one 
knows he is.
In spite of that, whenever one decides and acts, he is not a 
totality or an idea but an in concrete, given circumstances, in a 
situation that is specific and particular. In fact, one could never 
act at all if he wanted to wait for that totality to evolve as he 
tries to envision all premises and possibilities. The first conse­
quence of this tension between the unfinished idea and. the need to 
live, to choose, to decide at a certain time, now or never, is a
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sense of unfreedom in being tied to time and place and having one's pos­
sible probes and safeguards narrowed down. But then he experiences this 
definite choice as not just a negative and unfree thing he must do with­
out completing his ideal totality. It is this choice precisely that 
makes him aware of his original freedom, because it is only there that 
he knows himself as his true self. From this point of view all the 
other elements of freedom seem like mere preconditions to the manifes­
tation of existential freedom. Now, having recognized and adopted 
those earlier elements, he sees the limits within which there confronts 
him either a desperate sense of not being at all or an awareness of the 
possibility of Existenz itself.
An existential choice does not result from a struggle of motives,
as has been already pointed out. It is not a decision in which one
merely decides after performing some kind of calculation that has yielded
the correct result. Nor is it obedience to an objectively phrased norm.
Rather, the crux of the choice is that the I. chooses.
In this choice I resolve to be myself in existence. Resolu­
tion as such is not yet the rational will that makes me take 
some finite action "resolutely," despite everything. Nor 
does it lie in a heedlessly, blindly courageous existence.
Resolution is what comes to my will as the gift that in 
willing I can really be— it is what I can will out of, with­
out being able to will it. In resolution I plunge into free­
dom, hoping at the bottom of it to meet myself, because I can , 
will. But what manifests my resolution is my concrete choice.
In this free choice the individual holds himself responsible for 
himself, while from outside he is held responsible only for his actions 
in their factuality.
^Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 158-159.
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I know that I not only exist, that I not only am the way I 
am and therefore act in that way, but that as I act and 
decide I originate both my actions and the way I am. My 
resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer 
merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom 
in which I can no longer separate the choice and me because 
i  5™ this free choice. . . . What I am myself is left open, 
of course, because of decisions still unmade; to that extent 
I am not yet. But this not-being, in the sense of not-being- 
definitive in phenomenal existence, is illuminated by the 
existential certainty of my being where I choose and thus 
originate in resolution.
Nothing else will seem to an individual like real being once he 
has experienced that original feeling that made him the fountainhead of 
his own self. If possible, he would like nothing in himself to remain 
merely taken for granted. He would like to merge completely with his 
own choice, his own responsibility. Rather than resign himself to what 
is given in the objective world about him, his attitude will be one of 
taking responsibility for it to the extent to which his freedom allows. 
He knows there is no self-being when he denies his identity with his 
historic existence, for in this self-identification alone lies the 
potential for free choice and for unconditional commitment.
But unconditional commitment means leaving behind the delusive 
freedom of remaining in the realm of endless possibilities. He may not 
want to become real by making a compelling decision. Any choice, as 
long as it has not been made, has something uncertain and therefore 
disquieting about it. It requires an assurance before it can be made. 
Preceding this assurance there is a crisis of not knowing. On the one 
hand the fear when one cannot tell if it is the last try before stray­
ing into nonbeing or, on the other, the moment of existential decision.
5Ibid., p. 160.
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Yet it is essential for the being of Existenz that there must be a deci­
sion.
Either I decide as Existenz, or a decision will be made about 
me, turning me into material for someone else and stripping me 
of Existenz. Nothing remains unsettled. There is but a limited 
margin of temporal possibility beyond which I cannot postpone a 
decision without having it made about me rather than by me.
The steps leading to self-being are not one, however, but many. 
They are made up of many small acts, unnoticeable in detail but on the 
whole determining one's being. One may resist decision by shutting'his 
eyes because he does not want to will. Fearful of his freedom to bind 
himself by his own choice, he would like to shake off his responsibility 
and let things happen. Or, without any commotion, he may calmly and 
just as unnoticeably go his way in small inner and outer actions which 
strengthen his self-being through real decisions. To welcome freedom 
or to shun it, to accept responsibility for oneself or to shirk it, 
whichever one chooses habitually determines the kind of being he is.
Conceptualizing Freedom
As regards stating the meaning of existential freedom in formal 
terms, it must again be emphasized that no concept is capable of ade­
quately expressing its nature. It will be recalled that one cannot 
realize this freedom without knowledge, nor without being aware of the 
possibility of arbitrariness. In addition, self-assured obedience to 
an evident law and life viewed as a totality were likewise to be 
regarded as necessary conditions for freedom to become a reality. The 
origin of existential freedom sets it in opposition to the superfici­
ality of chance. Existential necessity places it up against the
^Ibid., p. 161.
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arbitrary volition of the moment. Responsibility and continuity, lastly, 
pit existential freedom against obliviousness and flight.
What the elucidation of freedom begins and ends with,however, 
is that it cannot be known as an object of empirical knowledge. One can 
only be certain of it for himself, not in thought but as Existenz, not 
in pondering and asking about it, but in action. Whatever one says 
about freedom serves merely as a means of communication, issuing only 
indirectly in any knowledge. It can be said that one does not possess 
freedom; he acquires it. Like freedom itself, conceptualizing freedom 
is in a sense pure movement. Thus no single expression can character­
ize the sense of freedom. Only the movement from one concept to the 
other will reveal a meaning that is not apparent in any one concept by 
itself.
If I say "I choose" and my sense of decision covers freedom 
proper, it still does not lie in arbitrary choice but in the 
necessity I mean when I say "I will," in the sense of "I 
must." Both terms assure Existenz of its original being as 
distinct from empirical existence; both would allow it to 
say, at that moment, "I am," and to mean free being. Only 
together can all these expressions— I am, I must, I will, I 
choose— be taken to express freedom. By itself, without 
interpretation by the others, each of them would mean either 
empirical existence or impulsive necessity or arbitrary psy­
chological action. In the sense of freedom all elements are 
so entwined as to make one source from the depths of which 
those single elements spring as phenomenal forms: there is 
no choice without decision, no decision without a will, no 
will without necessity, no necessity without being."7
Freedom in Relation to Existence, 
to Necessity, to Transcendence
Freedom has relevance and significance solely for self-becoming 
or Existenz. In the external world being is objective and comes within
7Ibid., p. 163.
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the domain of empirical knoxtfledge. But in this cognition there is not 
yet freedom, even though Existenz can only he free within the framexrork 
of temporal existence. Secondly, what merely happens within the con­
text of the empirical order is not free. It is caused or determined by 
necessity, since it is subject to the physical laws of cause and effect. 
Yet freedom finds scope for its exercise precisely either in opposition 
to necessity or in union with it. Finally, in Transcendence there is 
no longer any freedom. However, freedom remains the lever by which 
Transcendence acts on Existenz, but only as that Existenz is its inde­
pendent self. These three relationships of freedom to existence, 
necessity and Transcendence will now be further elaborated to derive 
their full import for existential elucidation.
At the moment in one's existence xxrhen he begins to ask about 
freedom, it may seem to him that he had always been potentially free.
His own ability to ask and decide lights up the possibility of being 
responsible for himself. Jaspers sees two equally original xrays in 
Xtfhich one is struck by the question of freedom. In the first he sees 
himself sinking into a bottomless void when he cannot reconcile free­
dom with his situation in the world. But as he ax^akens to freedom, 
he aligns himself again with his unique historical setting which he 
cannot and will not betray or discard. Or the possibility of unfree­
dom X'/hich seemed already behind him, looms before him again with fresh 
urgency. It occurs to him that there may be no freedom at all. Per­
haps freedom was a delusive notion of something that does not exist.
And his own responsibility, without which he can no longer be himself, 
was perhaps too only a phantom. Struck by the possibility of absolute 
unfreedom, he is shaken to the depths of his being. Unsure of freedom,
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he seeks to prove to himself that it does exist. If it does not suffice 
for him to be simply aware of freedom without knowing it, he will try to 
regain it in an objective fashion. The thoughts to which this leads will 
fail in themselves, but in failing and by contrast, they will much more 
decisively cast him back upon that true freedom about which the initial 
questioning arose.
There can be no freedom outside self-being since the objective 
world has neither a place nor an opening for it. One wills, moreover, 
because he does not know. The being which is inaccessible to knowledge 
can be revealed only to one's volition. Not knowing is the root of hav­
ing to will. And Jaspers adds,
This is the passion of Existenz: that its not knowing is not 
an absolute agony because it wills in freedom. The thought 
of an inescapable unfreedom would plunge me into despair at 
the fact of not knowing. The roots of freedom exclude it 
from the existence I explore; what rests on freedom is the 
being which I myself can be in existence.^
Each manifestation of freedom becomes meaningful insofar as each 
is opposed to the limitations of a necessity that either resists it, of 
one that rules it as a law, or of one that is its cause. A true sense 
of freedom unfolds either in opposition to some form of necessity or in 
union with it. Taking into account first that manifestation which 
becomes meaningful through a necessity which resists it, the following 
considerations are decisive. Freedom, although tending to make absolute 
demands on the individual for the realization of self-being, is relative 
as regards the world. The free man is always confronting something that 
is a given by nature, but a given that can mean to him either dependency 
or resistance. Moreover Jaspers remarks:
8Ibid., p. 167.
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In existential freedom I see myself between two necessities—  
between the natural law, the irremovable resistance of reality, 
and the moral law, the rigid form of a rule. I am in danger of 
being crushed betx^een the two. Yet if I seek to escape them 
instead of moving in both, in the closest proximity, my freedom 
is bound to get lost in fantasies. A sense of freedom that 
would place me wholly on my own would be untenable in such 
radical independence.9
Freedom likewise may be manifested by its opposition to a neces­
sity that is in a sense its cause. One is free to choose, but by his 
choice he binds himself, carries it out and takes the consequences.
What binds him is not the empirical reality xtfhich his actions made the 
way it is, but the inner, self-creating step he took at the moment of 
choice. He became the xyay he willed himself to be. Although in time 
the possibility of change always remains, his being is noxy bound by 
itself and yet still free. But in each new choice there is an even 
deeper necessity present,
. . . the one that lies in the feeling of "Here I stand; I 
cannot do otherwise," as Luther put it— in other xyords, in 
the feeling that "I must." It is with this feeling that 
Existenz makes its most original decisions about freedom.
Here is the point where some strange turns of speech make 
full sense: that man chooses the one needed thing, and 
"free" choice is out of the question; that absolute free­
dom is absolute necessity; that firmness in the right will 
leave no choice. . . . Hence the risk of total commitment 
at high points of decision; hence the impossibility of com­
ing to a decision from outside myself, by way of reasons; 
and hence, on the other hand, the profound certainty of an 
original sense of Existenz in making the decision. u
Freedom’s relation to Transcendence appears chiefly in the dual 
modes of dependence and independence, and in viewing Transcendence as 
both source and limitation of freedom. There are two possibilities 




according to Jaspers. In one he is entirely dependent. He has been 
cast into existence by a deity, and his will is not his own. His will 
would be of no help to him if this deity did not move it. But in last 
analysis this gift of moving man's will is undeserved, and he upon whom 
it is not bestowed is lost. Although this alternative is perhaps over­
stated by Jaspers and as such is not accepted as a viable possibility 
by anyone, yet it clearly remains an utterly unacceptable one if free­
dom is to retain anything of its true meaning.
In the other possibility one's sense of selfhood implicitly 
denies that kind of dependence. He is aware that he himself creates 
his selfhood through his will, not all at once, but in the ongoing 
actions of a lifetime.
I know that at the core I am independent, and it is from this 
core that I relate to Transcendence— to a Transcendence that 
has willed me to face it as a free man because I cannot other­
wise be myself. I myself am responsible for my will, for my 
actions, and for my original being.-'-1
Finally, freedom is poised in a dynamic polarity with Transcen­
dence when this Transcendence is seen as both source and limitation of 
existential freedom. Jaspers expresses this polarity in the form of a 
powerful antinomy.
Transcendence made me possible Existenz— in other words it made 
me free in temporal existence. To choose freedom and indepen­
dence from every structure of this world, to decide against any 
authority, does not mean to decide against Transcendence. It 
is before Transcendence that the man who is entirely on his own 
will most radically experience the necessity that puts him 
together into the hand of his God. . . . Having done something, 
for instance, I may know: I could not do this alone, and I 
could not do it again. If it was my true self that willed, it 
was simultaneously given to me in my freedom.^2
n ibid. , p. 173. 
12Ibid., p. 174.
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To summarize, this chapter has dealt with the central concept 
of existential freedom. First it took up the problem of free will, 
since it is through the will that freedom comes to be realized. Next, 
it considered the question of conceptualizing freedom from several 
vantage points. Freedom as knowledge, arbitrary act and as law were 
viewed as its necessary conditions. Then a consideration of freedom 
as idea, choice and responsibility showed how these touched on the 
essential nature of freedom. Lastly, after an attempt to state free­
dom in conceptual terms, it was further elucidated by seeing it in 
relation to existence, necessity and Transcendence.
CHAPTER IV
HISTORICITY: CONFINEMENT AND BREADTH OF EXISTENZ
Introduction
Existential freedom brings about the unfolding of Existenz 
solely within the context of a historicity which at once confines and 
at the same time opens up limitless possibility for self becoming. But 
in order to derive its full significance for the becoming of Existenz, 
Jaspers places the concept of historicity within the broader context of 
what he terms boundary situations. Viewed within this framework, his­
toricity as the first boundary situation makes one aware of the singu­
lar constraint of one's own individual data. At the same time this 
very constraint allows for the possibility of an uncertain future.
The uncertainty arising out of this boundary situation is such that 
what is left to be determined by oneself still lies ahead, while 
one's freedom finds its scope by assuming given facts and making 
them one's own as if they had been his will. It is in view of these 
considerations that this chapter will first develop the concept of 
historicity within the framework of a boundary situation. Then it 
will apply the consequences of this conceptual development to exis­
tential self-becoming by showing historicity as both confinement and 
breadth of Existenz.
When Jaspers speaks of historicity he is thinking of each 
human being as a noninterchangeable body in space, limited in his
v 40
41
possibilities of location. He is a being confined by others'existence 
to which he relates in one way or another. He may move toward that 
existence or reject it, fight it or use it, succumb to it or be des­
troyed by it. He comes and goes in time, spending his life in unrest 
or at least in ceaseless activity. Finding himself in a world of inex­
haustible possibilities, it is within them that he brings forth a world 
of his own. Within this temporal existence, and only within it, does 
authentic self-being become possible. "For me as temporal existence, 
historicity is the one mode of access I have to absolute b e i n g . A n d  
Existenz becomes aware of its utterly concrete space-bound and time- 
bound existence, its historicity, through what Jaspers calls historic
consciousness. Briefly stated, "Historic consciousness is the lucid,
2factual historicity of Existenz in existence.”
Historicity as a Boundary Situation
When placed within the perspective of boundary situations, a 
sense of historicity confers an absolute significance on existence, as 
grasped by self-being, and at the same time keeps it in suspension and 
relative, as mere existence. For Existenz to be caught up in this 
tension is what Jaspers means by historicity. And he further clari­
fies this tension by a consideration of historicity as a polarity of 
Existenz and existence, determinacy and freedom, time and timelessness.
First, this vital balance between Existenz and existence is 
disturbed when one's existence becomes absolute to him to the extent 
that he no longer sees it as limited empirical existence. This might
■̂ Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 107.
2Ibid., p . 105.
42
happen, among other ways, if he does not freely face an environment he 
feels unable to cope with. Or, if he is living only on the level of 
the senses as if there were nothing else to life. But even these situ­
ations can give rise to Existenz if he confronts them as an existence 
that has a meaning that transcends itself. They will lose their 
restraining force as he freely adopts existence as his historic 
determinacy.
Regarding the polarity betxtfeen determinacy and freedom it can 
be stated that, in historic consciousness, situations described as 
determined likewise appear to the individual as possibilities of free­
dom. A decision has been made whose outcome controls him, and at the 
same time it is still up to him as long as he lives. The decision once 
made makes him feel inevitably determined, but the chance to make his 
own decision makes him feel ultimately free. When he looks at given 
facts he is purely determined; when he looks at freedom, even defini­
tive decisions are definitive only as he sees them now. Although he 
cannot reverse them by new decisions, he can direct their significance 
by endowing them with a meaning yet unknown. He can think of every­
thing as taking place of necessity and regard himself as totally deter­
mined in the way he is, and he can cover everything with freedom thereby 
casting a ray of possibility on all definitive things.
If one is conscious of his Existenz, he does not see himself as 
just empirically given. His being appears to him as the possibility of 
choice, rather, and as decision. And yet, in this free origin he does 
remain historic because he can never make a new beginning. He must take 
the consequences of decisions that lie far beyond anything he has con­
sciously done, of decisions made even before he was born. But the
43
encompassing sense of historicity, the consciousness that there is no 
given fact without freedom and no freedom without given facts, makes 
him respect reality as such and at the same time keeps him boundlessly 
ready to take every real thing and clothe it with possibility. "The 
sense of historicity keeps me close to reality because the necessity 
in it freely guards the well from which I draw the meaning and the
O
substance of my actions."
Finally, "Existenz is neither timelessness nor temporality as
such. It is one within the other, not one without the o t h e r . F o r
Existenz historicity implies an intensification of the moment, turning
the present into a fulfillment that contains past and future within
itself but which is not diverted to either. This fulfillment is not
set as a future goal as if the present were a mere passing stage in
the service of things to come. Nor is it set in the past as if the
preservation and repetition of past perfection were all that one
lives for. But Existenz does not appaar immediately as a finished
product. It is acquired step by step, by way of decisions taken in
the course of time. Its phenomenal being is not in the single moment
but in the historic succession of interrelated moments.
In each of those the interrelation is felt: in waiting for 
the exalted moment, refusing to waste myself; in relating a 
lofty present to its premises, which I preserve and will not 
betray; in continuing to live by the exalted moment, which 





Historicity as Confinement and Breadth of Existenz 
As Confinement
At each moment the individual human exists by given data, and at 
the same time he must confront given data by referring his will and his 
actions to them. This is how it comes about that he is a being for him­
self as empirical existence, and how the concrete world to which he has 
access exists for him as a given he can mold. The concrete world, the 
real situation, confines him by the fact that it resists him thereby 
limiting his freedom and tieing him to restricted possibilities.
Jaspers envisions four different general forms of this resistance.
There is first the material which one uses. Although it fits 
the purpose he uses it for, it may be inadequate to itself since for 
itself it may have another destiny. Thus living things are consumed as 
nutriment by other living things and people become mechanical functions 
in a materialistic society. Next one confronts the life which he culti­
vates. He creates conditions for the life he wants and he lets it grow. 
The cultivated object is in a dependent state, however, though intended 
in itself and not as material for something else. It has no indepen­
dence other than the one provided by the cultivator. He faces third a 
soul which he educates. Training, habitual application, and instruction 
prepare the ground for a freedom which is presently viewed as merely 
possible. In this freedom he confronts last another mind with which 
he communicates. Though unconditionally recognizing his independent 
self-being, he seeks mutually his own being in the other. And Jaspers 
sets forth the qualities of this fourth mode of resistance: "No limi­
tations are established by any tacit purpose known to only one side.
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What counts is not persuasion but conviction, not suggestion but self- 
attained insight, not authority but accord."
One's unavoidable dependence on given facts of nature and on 
the volition of others makes up the external features of historicity 
insofar as it exercises a confining function in relation to Existenz.
This dependence is summed up by Jaspers in terms of the four general 
forms of resistance.
Each of these definite things I face creates the situation 
by resisting. The material balks; life develops differ­
ently from my expectations; the soul opposes its own origin 
to me, developing a mind of its oxm, a mind sustained by 
the self-being of Existenz . . J
As Breadth
Once historicity, which seemed to be nothing but resistance and 
confinement, is perceived as a boundary situation, it becomes the encom­
passing breadth of Existenz itself. But this breadth of Existenz is not 
simply a given in historically definite situations nor in a sense of his­
toricity as such. To achieve it one has to have an existential aware­
ness of his situation, to see it as a boundary situation. Nor is this 
existential awareness transferable. At the source of Existenz no man 
can substitute for another. "Everyone owes to himself what he is."* 8
As Existenz the individual does not act in a world at large.
Yet, insofar as his historical situation contains aspects common to all 
human beings, he goes on taking his bearings from such a world. In 
this activity he is not free in the sense of having eliminated the




resistance of material things and achieved full control over them, nor 
in the sense of having eliminated incomprehension through perfect exis­
tential communication. No, he is free in the sense that Existenz is 
able to transcend its own existence in the impetus arising out of a 
lucid historical awareness. As self-being he has the restless faculty 
of choice, the possibility of ascertaining a truth that lies in his 
singular and concrete situation.
When resistance is only partly surmounted by purposeful action, 
its insurmountable aspect will reveal the boundary situation to poten­
tial self-being. By making use of the ideas of freedom as resistless­
ness and as full accord, possible Existenz is achieved at the moment 
when the definite, the accidental, that which might as well be differ­
ent, is either freely assumed as suitable for oneself or rejected as a 
reality in violation of one's own essence. But the surpassing freedom 
of Existenz remains the choice for which no rightness and no idea can 
provide adequate reasons, the choice in which one either accepts or 
rejects his historic existence as his own.
What has just been said has been an attempt to show that what
could at first be thought of as the limitation of one's finite existence
is in fact its possible phenomenal fulfillment. What looked like mere
confinement for the idea of a world as the simple totality of existence
becomes the only reality for potentially unlimited Existenz.
It is in historicity that I clearly see the duplicity that 
makes out the unity of my true sense of being: I am only 
as temporal existence, and I myself am not temporal. I 
know myself only as existence in time, but in such a way 




The basic thrust of this chapter can be summarized in a single 
statement. Existential freedom is the primary source providing the 
impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within the confines 
of definite situations which limit at the same time as they open up 
limitless possibility for that self-becoming. Hoffman pinpoints the 
function of freedom in this context when he states: "Freedom becomes 
real only in its bond with the body and with the world, while the 
empirical order dips into subjectivity through its link with free­
dom.""^ And Jaspers himself drives home the complementary role of 
historicity in the context of the boundary situations as the former 
relates to Existenz: "As existence I am in situations; as possible 
Existenz in existence I am in boundary situations. . . .  To experi­
ence boundary situations is the same as Existenz."^
■^Kurt Hoffman, Basic Concepts of Jaspers' Philosophy, in 
The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. by P. A. Schilpp (New York: 
Tudor, 1957), p. 102.
11Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, pp. 182, 179.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNSELING 
Introduction
"To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz. 
This brief but powerful Jaspersian statement provides the capstone to 
the content of the preceding four chapters. Existential freedom has 
emerged as the primal source giving the impetus for the realization 
of Existenz, but only within the space- and time-bound situations 
which confine at the same time as they open up unlimited possibility 
for that self-realization.
It now remains to be seen what implications these existential 
ideas contain for counseling theory and practice. Two implications 
have already been stated in Chapter I. The first is that the coun­
selor recognizes the right and responsibility of the counselee to 
effect freely his own selfhood, something he has first validated for 
himself. The second implication is that the counselee freely accepts 
this right and responsibility for his own Existenz, rejecting 
dependence on the counselor to the extent that he is enabled to come 
to himself in authentic self-being. However, before examining these 
implications in detail, it will be useful to consider the possible
•̂ Karl Jaspers, Philosophy II, p. 179.
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philosophic frameworks for counseling. Having done this, it should be 
more readily seen what advantages the Jaspersian framework holds for 
counseling theory and practice.
Possible Philosophic Frameworks 
What has been written thus far has been based on a predis­
position toward an existential and specifically Jaspersian philosophic 
framework. To answer the question as to the advantages of the Jaspers­
ian construct over others requires a somewhat arbitrary selection 
regarding their number and kind. This writer proposes three struc­
tural frames based on Carl Rogers' treatment of three ways of know­
ing underlying the behavioral sciences, which would seem to include 
counseling in its theory and process.
First, there is the subjective way of knowing. This knowing 
arises within the individual's own internal frame of reference. In 
Rogers' words,
Within myself . . .  I may "know" that I love or hate, sense, 
perceive, comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or 
dislike, be interested in or bored by. These are all hypoth­
eses, which we often check . . .  by using the ongoing flow of 
our preconceptual experiencing as a referent.^
Rogers illustrates his point by citing Gendlin on how subjective know­
ing relates to psychotherapy.
Often an example of it in psychotherapy is the \<ray in which 
the client searches and searches for the word that will more 
accurately describe what he is experiencing, feeling, or per­
ceiving. There is a sense of real relief when he discovers a 
term which "matches" his experiencing, which provides a more
^Carl Rogers, Toward a Science of the Person (paper presented 
for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for 
Modern Psychology," Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963), 
p. 3.
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sharply differentiated meaning for the vague knowing which 
has been present, which permits him to be more congruent 
within himself.^
According to Rogers, little attention was being given to the subjective 
mode of knowing at the time at which he delivered his paper, because it 
does not lead to publicly validated knowledge. Yet he voiced the opin­
ion that even the most rigorous science has its origin in this mode of 
knowing.
When one tries to test these inner, subjective hypotheses by
checking with others or with the external environment, then he has
passed to the objective or second way of knowing.
In this type of knowing, the hypotheses are based upon an 
external frame of reference, and the hypotheses are checked 
both by externally observable operations, and by making 
empathic inferences regarding the reactions of a trusted 
reference group, usually of one's colleagues. . . . This 
psychological process is the basis of all logical positiv­
ism, operationalism, and the vast structure of science a^ 
we know it. Its achievements have been most impressive.
Such schools of counseling and psychotherapy as the behavioral and the 
psychoanalytic likewise look to the objective way of knotting as their 
theoretical foundation, and for that reason also depend on the identi­
cal psychological process at the root of all objective knowing.
Certain characteristics of this approach have not been ade­
quately understood. As Rogers says,
Since it has had such vast importance, and since it has led 
to such incredible technological advances, it is often for­
gotten that it is not necessarily superior to the first, sub­
jective way of knowing, and that in crucial instances, it
OE. T. Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, p. 7, 
in paper presented for a symposium on "Behavior and Phenomenology: 
Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology," by Carl Rogers (Rice Univer­
sity, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963).
^Carl Rogers, op. cit. , pp. 6-7.
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bows to it. For example, the evidence for extrasensory per­
ception is better than, or certainly as good as, the evidence 
for many of the principles which psychologists believe. Yet, 
with very few exceptions, psychologists reject this evidence 
with vehemence. It is not easy to impugn the methods which 
have been used in studying ESP, for they are the same as 
those used in any field of psychology. But the psychologist 
falls back on his subjective knowing. The evidence does not 
fit with the pattern of knowledge as he expects to find it, 
does not fit with his experiencing of the world. Therefore 
he rejects it. There have been many instances of this sort 
in the history of science. . . . The reason for pointing 
out these crucial uncertainties is to indicate the error of 
the widespread notion that objective knowledge is "out there," 
firm, impersonal, and secure. Quite the contrary, it is a 
very human invention— one of enormous value . . . but it is 
none the less a fallible and human way of knowing.^
A third mode of knowing, called interpersonal knowing by Rogers, 
is regarded by him to be somewhere in between the two types of knowing 
already described. This mode applies primarily to knoxvledge of human 
beings and the higher organisms. Rogers describes it pointedly in the 
first person.
Here I "know" that you feel hurt by my remark, or that you 
despise yourself, or that you have a strong desire to get 
"to the top of the heap" . . . These knoxrlngs, like those 
described before, are all hypotheses. But in these 
instances, the way of checking these hypotheses is to use 
whatever skill and empathic understanding is at my command 
to get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological 
field, to get inside your private world of meanings, and 
see whether my understanding is correct. I may simply 
bluntly ask you if my hypothesis is correct, but this is 
often a very inadequate method of inferring your private 
world. I may observe your gestures, words, inflections, 
and base my inferences on these. Or I may— and here is 
the essence of my experience in psychotherapy— create a 
climate which makes it psychologically safe and reward­
ing for you to reveal your internal frame of reference.6
-*Ibid. , pp. 9-10. 
^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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Two criteria for this type of knowing are suggested by Rogers.
I believe the criteria are twofold; either my hypothesis 
about the internal frame of reference of this individual 
is confirmed by the individual himself, or the inferences 
made about his internal frame of reference are confirmed 
by a concensual validation. For example, I sense that you 
are feeling unhappy this morning. If I say, "Looks as 
though your world is pretty dark this morning," and you by 
word or nod show your agreement, then I have checked my 
hypothesis and found that it has some validity. Another 
method of checking would be that if I kept to myself my 
empathic sensing of your unhappiness, but during the morn­
ing three other individuals came to me independently to 
speak of their concern over what seemed to them as your 
sadness, your depression, and the like, then the probabil­
ity of the correctness of the inference as to your inter­
nal state would be greatly increased.7
Three ways of knowing have been described. It now remains to 
relate these modes to each other and to specific schools of psychologi­
cal and counseling theory. Having done this, it should then be possible 
to point out the advantages for counseling theory the Jaspersian philo­
sophic framework possesses over others. In Rogers’ view the three modes 
of knowing are three ways by which one extends knowledge, by which one 
confirms or disconfirms the hypotheses one is continuously forming, 
both as a part of everyday living and as a part of psychological 
science. He says further,
I would advance the view that any mature psychological science 
uses each of these ways of knowing in appropriate relationship 
to the other two, that it is only as these three modes of know­
ing are adequately and appropriately interwoven that a satis­
factory behavioral science can emerge. . . .  I believe that 
recent history shows us that we make a serious mistake when 
we attempt to use one of these channels of knowing in isola­
tion, without reference to the others. Thus the behaviorist 
frequently regards himself as using only the objective mode 
of knowing, and sees the other modes as objects of scorn, or 
at least completely unnecessary to a developing science. Some 
current existentialist thinkers, on the other hand, seem
7Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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equally passionate in rejecting the objective way of knowing, 
relying entirely on the subjective and phenomenological way of 
knowing. Another type of mistake is made when we confuse or 
equate these very different modes of knowing. It is of the 
utmost importance to be entirely clear as to the mode we are 
using at any particular moment or in any particular enterprise.
When we become confused as to which avenue to knowledge is 
being utilized, or attempt to equate the knowledge from these 
three modes, serious trouble arises. Much psychoanalytic writ­
ing exhibits this latter error to a painful degree.8
Rogers points with optimism to the fact that the so-called new 
third force in psychology shows signs of being willing to use all three 
of these channels to knowing for the advancement and enrichment of 
science. However, what he does not do, it seems to this writer, is to 
provide a broad philosophic framework within which to situate these 
admittedly rather comprehensive views of human knowing. It is proposed 
that this philosophic framework is to be found precisely in Jaspers' 
concept of the encompassing. Within this comprehensive construct, one 
could relate Rogers' subjective knowing to Jaspers' mode of Existenz, 
objective knowing to the mode of consciousness-at-large, and interper­
sonal knowing to Jaspers' concept of existential communication. The 
logical question as to the advantage of the Jaspersian framework over 
others requires further treatment and thus provides the principal 
thrust of the second section of this chapter.
Jaspersian Concepts and Counseling 
Returning to the mainstream of this study, it must now be asked 
what are the implications for counseling theory of existential freedom 
within the limitations as well as the potentialities deriving from one's 
historicity. It was stated earlier that these implications xrere
8Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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primarily twofold. The proposal of this study, broad and comprehensive 
in its scope, affirms that Jaspers' concept of existential freedom pro­
vides an adequate precondition for self-becoming or Existenz. Deriving 
from this are two major implications bearing directly on the counseling 
relationship. The first affects primarily the counselor's attitude 
toward the counselee; the second, the counselee's response to this 
attitude, together with its significance for the latter. These topics 
will now be considered in more detail.
That the Jaspersian concept of existential freedom embodies 
the indispensable prerequisite to the self-being of Existenz in the 
context of its historicity, follows from the essential movement of 
Chapters III and IV. This movement is epitomized in the concluding 
paragraph of Chapter IV.
Existential freedom is the primary source providing the 
impulse for the self-becoming of Existenz arising within 
the confines of definite situations which limit at the 
same time as they open up limitless possibility for that 
self-becoming.9
Here existential freedom is regarded as the origin, and historicity 
as both limitation and breadth, of self-becoming. Since this theme 
has already been dealt with at some length, further elaboration would 
seem redundant.
However, further delineation of the implications of existen­
tial freedom for the counseling relationship seems necessary. First, 
the counselor will recognize the right and responsibility of the coun­
selee to his own free self-determination and self-becoming, provided 
the counselor has already validated this freedom for himself. Second,
^C. Ries, "Freedom and Self-Becoming in Karl Jaspers' Existen­
tial Philosophy" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
North Dakota, 1973), p. 47.
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the counselee will respond to the counselor's attitude toward him by 
progressively assuming responsibility for his own Existenz, and by 
gradually rejecting dependence on the counselor as he grows in self- 
awareness and authentic self-being. This reciprocity of potential­
ity and exigency inherent in the very nature of existential freedom 
appears evident from all that has been said in Chapter III concern­
ing that central concept. Finally, Jaspers himself, when referring 
explicitly to the therapist-client relationship, seems to attest to 
this same essential idea.
Therefore what is left as the ultimate thing in the doctor- 
patient relationship is existential communication, which 
goes far beyond any therapy, that is, beyond anything that 
can be planned or methodically staged. The whole treatment 
is thus absorbed and defined within a community of two 
selves who live out the possibilities of Existenz itself, 
as reasonable beings. For example, there are no rules 
deriving from some supposed assessment of the individual 
as a whole, which determine whether the person shall con­
ceal or reveal; nor is the whole thing quite fortuitous, 
as if the person might listen to everything and then be 
left to his own devices. One questions and gropes from 
one freedom to another x^ithin the concreteness of the 
actual situation, taking no responsibility for the other 
nor making any abstract demands. . . . The doctor is not 
a pure technician nor pure authority, but Existenz itself 
for its oxim sake, a transient human creature like his 
patient.̂
It should be pointed out that Jaspers is speaking here of the possible 
final or ultimate step in the therapeutic relationship. At the same 
time he presupposes an entire series of stages of therapeutic activ­
ity, each of which builds upon and succeeds the one preceding it.
Much of what has been said or implied regarding the counseling 
relationship has had to do xd_th its possibilities. Nevertheless, this
-*-̂ Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, trans. by J. Hoenig 
and M. W. Hamilton (Manchester, England: University Press, 1963), 
pp. 788-789.
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relationship likewise has its limitations, and these are insurmountable,
according to Jaspers. First of all, therapy cannot be a substitute for
something that only life itself can bring.
For instance, we can only become transparently ourselves 
through a lifetime of loving communication in the course 
of a destiny shared with others. . . .  A professional per­
formance constantly repeated on behalf of many never reaches 
the goal which only engagement in mutuality can attain. Fur­
ther, life brings responsible tasks, perforce, and there are 
the real demands of work which no therapy hox^ever artful can 
contrive. ̂
The second limitation is,
A person is originally thus and no other and therapy finds 
itself confronted with this factor which it cannot alter.
I in my freedom may confront this fact that I am thus and 
no other, confront it as something I may change or at least 
transform through acceptance, but any therapy of others has 
to reckon with unalterable elements, the mark of some last­
ing essence, something inborn. . . . The therapeutic atti­
tude can only retain its integrity if it accepts that funda­
mentally .
These limitations intrinsic to the counseling relationship bring the 
individual back to the sober realization that he, and ultimately he 
alone, must assume full responsibility for his own freedom and self- 
becoming.
This final chapter has been an attempt to outline the implica­
tions for counseling theory of the key existential concepts of freedom 
and historicity. First, the advantages of the Jaspersian model of 
counseling were considered. Then the implications of existential 
freedom for the individual person and for the counseling relationship 
were set forth. Finally, some limitations of the counseling relation­
ship were indicated. Jaspers seems to synthesize the central theme
-̂ I bid. , p . 804. 
12Loc. cit.
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of the entire study in these words:
. . . in therapy the widest polarities lie in whether the 
doctor turns to what can be discovered by science, that is 
to the biological event, or whether he turns to the freedom 
of man. A mistake is made about the whole of human life, 
should the doctor in looking at persons let them be sub­
merged in the biological event; so too, should he convert 
human freedom into that sort of being which, like nature, 
is empirically there and can be used technically as an 
instrument of therapy. Life I can treat, but to freedom 
I can only appeal. ̂-3
l-%.arl Jaspers, op. cit. , p. 800.
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